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Abstract. Safety standards prescribe change impact analysis (CIA) during evo-
lution of safety-critical software systems. Although CIA is a fundamental ac-
tivity, there is a lack of empirical studies about how it is performed in practice. 
We present a case study on CIA in the context of an evolving automation sys-
tem, based on 14 interviews in Sweden and India. Our analysis suggests that 
engineers on average spend 50-100 hours on CIA per year, but the effort varies 
considerably with the phases of projects. Also, the respondents presented 
different  connotat ions  to  CIA and perceived the importance of CIA 
differently. We report the most pressing CIA challenges, and several ideas on 
how to support future CIA. However, we show that measuring the effect of such 
improvement solutions is non-trivial, as CIA is intertwined with other devel-
opment activities. While this paper only reports preliminary results, our work 
contributes empirical insights into practical CIA. 
Keywords: change impact analysis, safety-critical systems, case study research. 
1 Introduction 
Safety-critical software systems evolve during their lifecycle. As changes are made to 
the systems, change impact analysis (CIA) is needed, defined as “identifying the po-
tential consequences of a change in a system, or estimating what needs to be modified 
to accomplish a change” [2]. CIA is essential for safety assurance, and it is indeed 
prescribed by safety standards, e.g. IEC 61508 states that “if at any phase of the soft-
ware safety lifecycle, a modification is required pertaining to an earlier lifecycle 
phase, then an impact analysis shall determine (1) which software modules are im-
pacted, and (2) which earlier safety lifecycle activities shall be repeated.” 
CIA is often a difficult task in practice due to the size and complexity of safety-
critical systems [2, 7]. Inadequate CIA has further been among the causes of accidents 
and near-accidents in the past [10]. Industry can clearly benefit from new CIA tech-
nology and knowledge to more cost-effectively perform this safety assurance activity, 
enabling better risk avoidance and mitigation. Such technology and knowledge must 
be linked to current practices and targeted at meeting industry needs and expectations.  
Despite the importance of CIA for safety-critical systems, the current knowledge 
about the state of the practice is limited. We are not aware of any publication that has 
studied the CIA activity in depth. The available knowledge is based on studies that (1) 
have dealt with non-safety-critical systems, (2) have analyzed data from past projects, 
(3) have not focused on CIA, or (4) have surveyed practices for safety-critical systems 
from a general perspective. For example, Rovegård et al. [14] interviewed software 
practitioners to analyze CIA issue importance, whereas Borg et al. [3] studied past 
issue reports of an industrial control system. Some insights have been provided in 
studies on e.g. the alignment of requirements with verification and validation [1] and 
on traceability [13]. Regarding the surveys, Nair et al. [12] studied safety evidence 
management practices, including certain aspects related to change management, and 
de la Vara et al. [7] conducted a survey on safety evidence CIA to explore the circum-
stances under which it is performed, the tool support used, and the challenges faced. 
We have conducted an industrial case study on CIA for safety-critical systems in 
practice, particularly exploring engineers’ views on the work involved. The context is 
a distributed development organization offering industrial control systems to a global 
market. We interviewed 14 engineers in two units of analyses, constituted of two 
teams located in Sweden and India, respectively. This paper reports a preliminary 
analysis covering a subset of the interview guide. 
Our long term goal is to support architectural decision making when evolving 
cyber-physical systems, an endeavor in which the CIA is fundamental. As a step in 
this direction, we explore three research questions: RQ1) How extensive is the CIA 
work task?, RQ2) What are the engineers’ attitudes toward CIA?, and RQ3) How 
could CIA be supported? By better understanding CIA in a particular case, we can 
take steps toward understanding how previous knowledge could be stored to support 
decision making in software evolution, in line with our previous work on traceability 
reuse [3] and knowledge repositories [6]. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the case, and Sec-
tion 3 describes the research methodology. We report our results and discuss their 
implications in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work. 
2 Case Description 
The case company develops safety-critical industrial control systems. The system 
under study is has evolved since the 1980s and needs to fulfil the IEC 61511 standard 
via Safety Integrity Level 2 certification, according to the IEC 61508 standard. The 
developed software must be of high quality and therefore all changes to source code 
need to be analyzed prior to implementation. Moreover, detailed system documenta-
tion is created and mapped to the vertical abstraction layers in the V-model. The pro-
jects follow a rigid development process with hundreds of collaborating engineers 
distributed globally. The code base is over one million lines, dominated by C/C++ 
and some newer extensions in C# or VB.  
Prioritized features originating from various customers (and sometimes pre-
ordered feature requests) are incrementally added and extensively tested. When de-
veloping new features and also when fixing issues to previously delivered features, 
several changes are made to the source code. When the development is over, the de-
velopment organization needs to present a safety case for an external assessor, illus-
trating that the system is acceptably safe for a given application in a given operating 
environment. The set of CIA analyses is a crucial component of the safety case. 
Therefore, the safety engineers at the case company have developed a semi-structured 
CIA report template, cf. Table 1, to support the safety case in relation to the IEC 
61508 safety certification. The developers use this template to document their CIA 
before committing source code changes. 
Currently there is limited tool support available for CIA in the organization. The 
CIA process is tightly connected with the issue management process, as all changes to 
formal development artifacts require an issue report in the issue repository. All com-
pleted CIA reports are stored in the issue repository as attachments to issue reports. 
Developers typically access the issue repository using a simple web interface. 
 
Table 1. CIA template used in the case company, adapted from Klevin [8]. 
Q1) Is the reported problem safety critical? 
Q2) In which versions/revisions does this problem exist? 
Q3) How are general system functions and properties affected by the change? 
Q4) List modified code files/modules and their SIL classifications. 
Q5) Which library items are affected by the change? (e.g., library types, firmware) 
Q6) Which documents need to be modified? (e.g., reqts. specs, architecture) 
Q7) Which test cases need to be executed? (e.g., design/functional/sequence tests) 
Q8) Which user documents, including online help, need to be modified? 
Q9) How long will it take to correct the problem, and verify the correction? 
Q10) What is the root cause of this problem? 
Q11) How could this problem have been avoided? 
Q12) Which requirements and functions need to be retested by test organization? 
3 Research Methodology 
We conducted a multiple unit industrial case study since the studied phenomenon 
could not be separated from its context [15]. The case under study is the CIA activity 
in the development organization described in Section 2. Two development teams 
constitute the units of analysis, referred to as Unit Sweden and Unit India, respective-
ly. Figure 1 shows an overview of the study. 
Four researchers iteratively (1) designed the case study and documented it in a 
case study protocol. All the steps in the design were reviewed by senior researchers. 
We constructed an interview guide (available online
1
) for semi-structured interviews 
to be able to ask both close and open-ended questions. We asked open questions in 
the beginning and end of the interviews, in line with the time glass interview model 
                                                          
1 http://serg.cs.lth.se/fileadmin/serg/ImpRec_EvalStudy/ImpRec_InterviewGuides.pdf 
[15]. This paper reports only on an analysis of a subset of the questions asked. Table 2 
maps the RQs to specific parts of the interview guide. 
The data collection consisted of (2) interviews in Swedish or English. For confi-
dentiality reasons, a single researcher conducted all interviews. The same researcher 
(3) transcribed all interviews word by word and sent them back to the interviewees 
for (4) validation. We interviewed 14 engineers of whom 10 are developers that write 
source code and its documentation. More specifically, we interviewed one R&D man-
ager, one safety engineer, three senior developers (incl. the team leader), and one 
junior developer in Unit Sweden, and one product manager, one technical manager, 
four senior developers (incl. the team leader), and two junior developers in Unit India. 
As a preliminary (5) analysis step, the transcripts were copied into a spreadsheet 
divided according to the interview guide. Longer answers were divided into smaller 
chunks. The spreadsheet was then (5.1) cleaned to remove obsolete and unimportant 
pieces of spoken language. 
The iterative (5.2) coding process started by highlighting key statements, to estab-
lish a quick overview of the data and support subsequent data navigation. We then 
applied the following coding schemes: Pre2-a followed a two dimensional axial cod-
ing [16] with “connotation to CIA” vs. “importance of CIA” coded into the interval [-
2, 2] to express positive/negative connotation and importance, respectively; Pre2-b 
used predefined closed codes: daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, and rarely; Pre2-c 
was coded onto a timeline, expressing either point estimates or (min.-avg.-max.) in-
tervals; Pre2-d employed open coding that evolved into 12 codes: test cases, docu-
ments, information overload, prolonged time, motivation, confidence, requirements, 
time estimation, avoidance, root cause, system version, and conformance; Pre3 used 
the interval [-2, 2] to signal whether the proposed metrics were indicative of time 
needed, and difficulty to conduct, a CIA; Pre4 used open coding that developed into: 
tool, training, template, search, traceability, and reviews. The coded interviews were 
then (5.3) analyzed to detect patterns and draw conclusions based on the qualitative 
data. 
Finally, we (6) report our results in this publication. To preserve the confidentiali-
ty of the interviewees, we do not provide full traceability from the answers. We use 
the labels engineer/developer and junior/senior when needing to be more specific. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the research process. Smileys depict the number of re-
searchers involved in the various steps. 
Table 2. Breakdown from RQs to specific parts of the interview guide. 
RQ ID Part of the interview guide
1
 
RQ1. How extensive 
effort do engineers 
spend on CIA? 
Pre2-b Do you conduct CIAs daily/weekly/monthly? 
Pre2-c How much time do you spend on a CIA? 
Pre2-d What are the greatest CIA challenges? 
RQ2. What are the 
engineers’ attitudes 
toward CIA? 
Pre2-a 
What is your general opinion about the CIA 
work task? 
RQ3. How could 
CIA be supported? 
Pre4 
What kind of support would you like to have 
access to when conducting CIAs? 
Pre3 
We have collected data from your CIA history. 
Could you please comment on the metrics? 
- Pre3-b: Do the numbers reflect how long it 
takes to conduct a CIA? [TIME] 
- Pre3-c: Some CIAs have been modified. Does 
this mean they were harder? [MODS] 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 RQ1: Extensiveness of the Change Impact Analysis Task 
To understand how extensive the engineers consider the CIA work task to be, we 
investigate: 1) how frequently engineers perform CIA, 2) how much time is needed to 
complete a CIA, and 3) what engineers consider as the major CIA challenges.  
 
Change Impact Analysis Frequency. All the interviewees experienced with CIA 
stressed that the frequency of conducting CIA varies much, from daily to monthly 
CIAs, depending on the development phases. Four interviewees reported that they 
sometimes conduct CIA on a daily basis, and other four estimated that they do it 
weekly during the most intensive periods. Four other interviewees explained that their 
CIA intensity goes down to monthly during certain periods, while three interviewees 
answered bi-weekly CIAs at slow times. Five interviewees shared only estimates of 
their average CIA intensities: four reported weekly and one stated daily. A senior 
engineer in Unit Sweden estimated that a typical developer conducts 20 CIAs related 
to bug corrections per year. A senior engineer in Unit India stated a higher estimate: 
“in the thick of a project, a developer will do [a CIA] almost every day”. We conclude 
that the engineers estimate the average intensity to be one CIA per week, considering 
variations due to cyclic development phases and parallel projects. 
     The main reason for the variation is the stage-gate development process employed 
by the company; at the initial stages of a project, when the bulk of the new develop-
ment is conducted, there is considerable source code churn, and changes are not man-
aged on the level of individual issues. A senior engineer explained “we package new 
development as generic items in our issue tracking system, and then we conduct one 
comprehensive CIA”. Once a project reaches the “code complete” milestone and the 
formal verification phase is initiated, the goal is to stabilize the quality of the system, 
and all changes after this stage are considered bug corrections. The change manage-
ment process then increases its granularity to individual bug resolutions.  
 
Change Impact Analysis Effort. We asked the interviewees how much time they 
invested in a CIA, by providing the minimum, average, and maximum time needed. 
For the four non-developer interviewees, we instead asked them to approximate the 
time developers spend on CIAs. Four interviewees reported only an average CIA 
effort, i.e., a point estimate. Figure 2 presents an overview of the collected data. Simi-
larly to the frequency results, the time required to conduct an individual CIA varies 
substantially. A senior developer stressed that the effort needed depends on the com-
plexity of the involved component, and another senior developer expressed that it also 
depends on the structure of the corresponding documentation.  
 
Figure 2. Interviewees’ estimates of CIA effort. Bars depict minimum and maxi-
mum effort, circles show the average. Interviewees 5-14 are developers.  
 
Three interviewees estimated that the average CIA requires 1-2 hours, four inter-
viewees answered 4-6 hours, and three interviewees reported 1-2 days. On the contra-
ry, two interviewees answered that they complete the average CIA in less than an 
hour, more specifically 30-40 min and 5 min, respectively. A senior engineer shared 
his rule of thumb regarding issue management and CIA: “a normal issue, or slightly 
more challenging than normal, takes in total roughly a man week to resolve. I esti-
mate the CIA to require 10% of that time, 4 h. /…/ Then there are much faster issues 
that are resolved in a man day. 10% of that means about 1 h for the CIA”. 
Eight of the interviewees claimed that the minimum time required to complete a 
CIA is 30 minutes or less, of which two answered 5 minutes or less. Two senior de-
velopers in India reported that quick CIAs still require an hour or two, motivated by 
“there are 13 questions to correctly answer” and “if you fill it in honestly, without 
copy-paste”. Regarding the maximum time, four interviewees claimed 1-2 days, two 
answered a week, and a junior developer instead expressed “several months of calen-
dar time”. Two senior developers in India shared contrasting views, claiming that the 
most time-consuming CIAs still could be finished in 15-20 min.  
We noted three main explanations for the reported variation. First, it is hard to de-
tach the CIA from the general issue resolution, thus the interviewees interpreted the 
questions differently. The exploratory work involved in reproducing and understand-
ing an issue is often intertwined with the CIA. To understand an issue well enough, 
developers must sometimes set up a specific test environment, stepping through 
source code, etc. As a senior developer put it: “there is considerable exploratory work, 
and it would require almost as much time without the formal CIA”. Second, the com-
plexity among the parts of the system is not constant. The same interviewee considers 
issues related to the embedded environment to be the most complex, and maintenance 
issues on isolated components to be simple. Quick CIAs occur when an issue needs to 
be corrected in several system versions, and parts of the CIAs can be reused. Third, 
experienced developers conduct CIAs faster than novices. Three junior developers 
reported relatively high estimates, and two senior engineers stressed the importance of 
experience and system understanding for successful CIAs. 
 
Major CIA Challenges. We received 25 challenges from 14 interviewees that cover 
both general and specific aspects, presented in Table 1. Note that Table 1 comprises 
also questions that deal with issue management in general, e.g. Q9-Q11, as reflected 
by some interviewees’ answers. 
 The most frequently mentioned general challenge was related to motivation, i.e., 
understanding why comprehensive CIAs are part of the process and recognizing their 
value. The difficulty to appreciate the CIA activity was primarily expressed in the 
Swedish unit of analysis, by both seniors and juniors alike; seniors struggling more 
with motivating others, whereas juniors talked about motivating themselves. A senior 
engineer explained: “my main challenge is to explain and motivate why we do CIA, 
because if you know why you have to do it, you accept it. But we must continuously 
remind ourselves why we do it.” and “if we get the developer to see that the CIA is 
very good, it helps me in my work /…/ That’s what we´re aiming for”. 
The second most commonly mentioned general CIA challenge is related to infor-
mation overload. The three most senior engineers in the study, explained that obtain-
ing a system understanding is hard due to the complexity. Apart from the source code, 
there are numerous documents describing the system. The sheer number of software 
artifacts contests the system overview, and makes traceability information highly 
complex. A senior engineer stated: “finding the right information has historically been 
the major challenge /…/ In principle you had to hunt down key people and ask for 
documents and dependencies, and you didn’t necessarily get the answer”. 
Three additional general CIA challenges were mentioned. First, sometimes devel-
opers need to update previous CIAs that were conducted a long time ago (half a year 
before according to a junior developer). Returning to old issues is difficult and re-
quires considerable time and effort. Second, one interviewee said that his major chal-
lenge was to trust his own CIAs, i.e., establishing confidence in the answers to the 
questions in Table 1. As he explained it: “I’m not sure whether my answers are true or 
not, I cannot evaluate it. I am the judge.” Finally, one senior interviewee expressed 
that the major challenge was that the developers do not follow the CIA guidelines. 
Interviewees reported three CIA challenges specific to the questions in Table 1, all 
of them reported by two or three interviewees: 1) selecting which test cases should be 
executed to verify the changes (Q7), 2) understanding which requirements are affect-
ed by a change (related to Q6 and Q12), and 3) reporting which documents need to be 
updated to reflect the change (Q6). A senior developer explained that “the question 
about test cases is supposed to cover both directly and indirectly affected test cases, 
and the indirect ones are quite difficult.” Regarding the requirements, another senior 
developer said: “Requirements traceability is difficult. We do not have requirements 
that cover all aspects, and it is hard for developers to stay on top of all requirements. 
[As developers] we don’t work continuously with the requirements.” 
Concerning the challenges that deal with issue management in general, the inter-
viewees in Unit India reported four major challenges. Three interviewees explained 
that finding the root cause of an issue (Q10) is a major challenge. Two interviewees 
pointed out suggesting how the issue could have been avoided (Q11) as particularly 
difficult, and two others highlighted determining which system versions are affected 
by the issue (Q2). Finally, a senior developer in Unit India considered estimating the 
resolution time (Q9) as the major challenge. Our interviews suggest that developers 
answer the three questions Q9-Q11 with different levels of ambition, and two inter-
viewees from Unit India indicated that they invest considerable effort answering these 
questions. Concerning determining affected system versions, a senior developer clari-
fied: “sometimes you study the source code, sometimes you have to run tests in our 
lab [on multiple versions] /…/ This is not hard, but time-consuming.” 
Based on our interviews, it appears that determining how a change impacts the 
product source code is less of a challenge than determining impact on non-code arti-
facts, e.g., requirements, specifications, and test cases. Considerable research effort 
has been directed at CIA on the source code level [11], but neither junior nor senior 
engineers discussed source code in relation to the major challenges involved in CIA. 
Our results instead support conclusions from Lehnert [9] and de la Vara et al. [7], i.e., 
there is a need for CIA research that considers different artifact types.  
4.2 RQ2: Connotations of Change Impact Analysis 
We explored the engineers’ connotation to “change impact analysis”, i.e., the emo-
tional association carried by CIA, in addition to the explicit or literal meaning (the 
denotation). Furthermore, we map the connotation to the impression of how important 
CIA is to the individual interviewee, as presented in Figure 3. 
The interviewees’ attitudes toward CIA represent all quadrants in Figure 3. No in-
terviewees expressed very strong positive or negative connotations to “change impact 
analysis”. Most answers are balanced and we note that a majority of the engineers 
consider their CIAs important. Several interviewees shared positive associations, e.g., 
“a healthy sign” and “shows that we do complex software engineering”. Also, several 
interviewees had a neutral connotation: “no values on a personal level” and “just part 
of the job”. On the other hand, two interviewees expressed negative connotations: “a 
too heavy construct in our organization”, “unfortunately very rigid activity”, and 
“could be done in a better way”. 
Considering the interviewees’ perceived importance of the CIA activity to their 
work, all levels are covered. Responses range from “for some issues it is just worth-
less stuff, done for the process” to “professionally, it is very fundamental” and “side 
effects are extremely important in our complex product”. We identified no indications 
of attitude differences between the two units of analyses. Regarding the level of sen-
iority, there is a slight tendency of senior engineers considering CIA to be more im-
portant than juniors. This is no surprise, as the seniors have seen more cases of source 
code changes causing side effects, especially from earlier development work when the 
CIA was less formal, as explained by one senior engineer “we have seen many cases 
when fixes introduced bugs”. On the other hand, lack of experience can also induce a 
positive attitude, as expressed by one junior developer in Unit India: “This is my first 
company. Whatever I see, I feel is good”. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interviewees’ attitudes toward CIA. The y-axis shows the general connota-
tion of CIA, whereas the x-axis depicts how important interviewees consider the CIA.  
4.3 RQ3: Supporting Change Impact Analysis 
Envisioned Change Impact Analysis Support. As one might expect when asking 
software engineers for solutions to support CIA, the most frequent answer was tool 
support. Three interviewees suggested increasing the level of automation in CIA by 
introducing some kind of tool. Interestingly, all these interviewees are seniors, and all 
discuss approaches to identify impact beyond the source code level. A possible expla-
nation is that senior engineers are well-aware of the large efforts on establishing 
traceability in the organization, and that they consider the investment to be underuti-
lized. One interviewee explained how a tool could iteratively follow traces through 
the system, from an input source code file or module, to a design description and its 
corresponding design tests, then continue up the abstraction layers to functional speci-
fications and all the way up to the requirements. This could allow test identification 
directly from requirements, as a tool-oriented solution that would close the often chal-
lenging gap between requirements and test cases [1]. Another suggestion given by a 
recently employed senior developer was that “it is strange to attach a CIA report as a 
free-text string in a third party tool. In my previous company, this would have been 
done in an internally developed tool to better control the input [...] It would have been 
much easier to manage and interpret the data if the collection was more controlled.” 
Indeed other companies use internal tools for CIA of safety-critical systems [7]. 
Two senior interviewees proposed changes to the CIA template in Table 1. A sen-
ior engineer considered security to be of critical importance to the future of the organ-
ization, and requested adding explicit security questions to the template. The other 
interviewee would like to see the question about root cause analysis to be more elab-
orate (Q10). The same interviewee also advocated using more than one version of the 
CIA template, adapting the questions to the issue at hand, to address the impression 
of having a too rigid CIA process. Another suggestion mentioned by two interview-
ees, a junior and a senior engineer, is to increase the training of new employees on the 
specifics of CIA in the case company, motivated by: “a new guy needs to be thorough-
ly trained on these questions /…/ I see newcomers just filling in things for the sake of 
moving the issue through the process”. 
Individual interviewees proposed additional improvement suggestions. First, the 
search functionality in the issue tracking system should be improved. Although no 
interviewee reported the current issue tracking system to be a major challenge to CIA, 
several mentioned that the tool was old and not user friendly. Another considerable 
limitation is a lack of full-test searchers in the issue tracker. Our previous work ex-
plored the potential of introducing state-of-the-art search technology to index full-text 
descriptions of issue reports [5]. Second, one senior engineer considered the source 
code and the documents to be two discrete information spaces with few connections. 
Despite all efforts to maintain traceability at the company, the interviewee wanted to 
improve bi-directional connections between documents and source code. Third, one 
junior developer thought that the CIAs “are not taken in a serious way”, and proposed 
introducing CIA reviews before submitting them, as before committing code. 
 
Measuring Change Impact Analysis Support. Prior to the interviews, we explored 
the CIA history stored in the issue tracking system, and constructed two measure-
ments: TIME and MODS. We calculated these measurements for the relevant inter-
viewees and presented the results during the interviews.  
The first proposed measure, TIME, is the time between a developer is assigned an 
issue and the first CIA report is submitted. TIME thus targets CIA effort, but no inter-
viewee considered the measure to be correlated with the time it takes to actually con-
duct the CIA. Six interviewees directly rebutted the measure, and two did not know 
how to interpret it. The most skeptical views explained: “it’s definitely a question of 
priorities”, “I work on several parallel products, and that measure can be anything”, 
and “you have to measure when I start making related changes”. We conclude that 
TIME is a too confounded measure to be used for evaluating solutions that aim at 
decreasing the time needed for CIAs. 
The second proposed measure, MODS, is the number of modifications on a CIA 
report after its first submission. We suggested using this measure as a proxy for the 
difficulty of completing a particular CIA, thus related to CIA accuracy. The opinion 
about the validity of MODS differed. Three interviewees were positive or slightly 
positive to the measure, one of them claimed: “more modification clearly means it 
was a hard CIA. It means you couldn’t immediately capture everything”. On the other 
hand, two interviewees invalidated the measure entirely by showing that numerous 
modifications only deal with typos and copy-paste errors. One of them said: “I use 
Notepad without any spelling correction. /…/ When I paste it in the issue tracking 
system and submit, I get to see everything on a big screen and note the mistakes”. 
Another interviewee instead writes the CIA directly in the issue trackers input field, 
but explained: “one of the problems with the tool is that it doesn’t even stay open in 
five minutes, and it doesn’t even save your data [before closing]. This is such a worst 
tool.” When developers rush submitting CIA reports before the tool closes due to 
inactivity, the chances of introducing typos increases. We conclude that MODS is not 
a reliable measure for evaluating whether a solution leads to more accurate CIAs. 
In conclusion, TIME appears to not at all be correlated with the time needed to 
conduct CIA. On the other hand, MODS received some supporters, but others show it 
is confounded by trivial changes to such an extent that it cannot be trusted. While 
both measures are easy to collect from most systems logging time stamps and revision 
history, they both need improvements. TIME should originate from actual changes 
related to an issue rather than when the issue is assigned, and MODS could possibly 
be filtered to remove insignificant changes such as spelling corrections. 
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
We report on an industrial case study on engineers’ perspectives on Change Impact 
Analysis (CIA). We interviewed 14 engineers in two units of analysis in a global safe-
ty-critical software engineering context. Both the frequency of CIAs and the effort 
required to complete a CIA vary considerably, depending on the current phase of the 
development project as well as the complexity of the specific change. As a yearly 
average, our results suggest that developers in the case company spend roughly 50-
100 hours on CIA, corresponding to one CIA per week with 1-2 hours effort each. A 
senior engineer also shared his rule of thumb: “CIA takes roughly 10% of the time to 
resolve a normal issue”. We reported several major CIA challenges including com-
municating to developers that CIAs are necessary and beneficial, and to navigate the 
large document space accompanying the source code, especially the requirements. We 
present empirical evidence confirming that CIA is an important but costly activity in 
safety-critical software development, worthwhile to address in future work. 
We explored engineers’ attitudes by mapping their connotation of CIA versus the 
perceived importance of their CIAs. All combinations were identified in our study, as 
well as a trend that CIAs are considered increasingly important with increasing sen-
iority. Our interviewees shared eight CIA improvement suggestions, including addi-
tional tool support, improved traceability, newcomer training, and CIA reviews. 
Quantitatively measuring the value of CIA support appears difficult however, as CIA 
is rarely conducted as an isolated activity, but rather is deeply intertwined with issue 
management and development in general. We found that simple analysis of CIA revi-
sions is too confounded to evaluate improvement suggestions, thus future work is 
needed to develop reliable quantitative measures. 
Our preliminary study is subject to a number of limitations. Due to a non-
disclosure agreement, both the interviews and the analysis were done by only the first 
author (cf. Fig. 1). In the next step of this study, we will address the single-
perspective bias by adding another researcher in a validation step, e.g., to evaluate the 
coding schemes. Moreover, we plan to further increase the validity of our conclusions 
by data triangulation, i.e., by studying real CIAs stored in the issue tracker.  
When making architectural decisions on how to evolve a software system, under-
standing the impact of competing alternatives is important, i.e., the CIAs are valuable 
input to the decision maker. In prior work, we have stored trace links from previous 
CIAs in semantic networks to help future developers by recommending potential im-
pact [3, 4]. Now we aim to raise the level of abstraction to study impact of architec-
tural decisions, i.e., to provide less granular recommendations for evolving software 
systems. As part of our ongoing work, we have proposed storing experiences from 
previous decisions in a knowledge repository [6]. As our current case study indicates 
that engineers put numerous hours into CIAs, and typically value their content, we 
argue that CIAs should also be incorporated in the knowledge repository. 
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